6
Adam Foster
B00318563
March 29, 2011
Evaluating The End of History in the face of Marxist and Nietzchean Critiques
In the works of German philosopher G.W.F Hegel, we read that history is a grand movement in which there is a goal that is trying to be fulfilled. It thus follows that there be "progress" in history as we move towards this goal, and an "end of history" when the goal is reached. Two questions arise from this notion: first, was G.W.F Hegel right in this assumption? And second, have we reached the end history? In the twenty-first century, most individuals would say that the notion of history ending is absurd. Political theorist Francis Fukuyama encountered this when he argued the end of history had arrived when liberal democracy conquered communism in the late 1980's, and his thesis was rejected by academia. Furthermore, Fukuyama's argument has proven to be incorrect with the September 11th attacks in New York City and the District of Columbia and the new threat of Islamic fundamentalism. Yet the rise of this new threat could be interpreted merely as another stepping stone that liberal democracy must tread; perhaps the final stepping stone. It is therefore the goal of this paper to demonstrate that, yes, there is such thing as progress in history, and that liberal democracy will therefore spread to the Middle East. Yet at the same time, there is no "end of history," as is shown through Friedrich Nietzsche's critique of Hegelian thought.
The first task will be to define the necessary terms needed to understand Hegel's philosophy of history and the political ideologies related to it. This will be followed by an explanation of Hegel's thought on the subject. Once this background has been established, the paper will then shift to considering the validity of Hegel's claims by way of the "democratic peace thesis." Finally, the Nietzschean critique will be considered.
It is crucial to first draw one's attention to the philosophical origin of "progress" in history; G.W.F Hegel. In The Philosophy of History, it is Hegel's goal to answer the question "what is the ultimate design of the world?" (Hegel, 814). By this he means, what have all of the historical events in the world been leading up to? What is is history's goal? Hegel is here asking what will be "the end of history." At the very root of Hegel's theory is the notion of "spirit," which is the basic unit of historical change. Hegel posits that spirit is comprised of "freedom," which he describes as a lack of impediment in both the physical and metaphysical realm (Hegel, 814-815). "Spirit" is an aspect of the individual, yet in itself it does not influence him and man is not aware of its existence, for it is incorporeal. It does, however, manifest itself in manas passions (Fillion, 92) — which will be explored in greater detail at a later point.
It first important to note that the ultimate design that he speaks of is not drawn by individual spirits, but rather a collection of all the individual spirits to form a larger "world spirit". One should remember that the composition of spirit is freedom; the formation of the world spirit is an attempt to implement this freedom in to the entire world. Therefore, as Hegel states, history is "the means by which Freedom develops itself in the world" (Hegel, 816). This also makes the question inherently political, as Hegel states that, in coming to a conclusion regarding progress in history, "we must consider the shape which the perfect embodiment of Spirit assumes — the state" (Hegel, 814).
This gives us a broad sense on how history occurs in the Hegelian tradition. Our attention will now shift and focus in on the individual, for — though it is true that history is part of a larger movement above and beyond the individual — spirit effects change through its host; the individual. As previously mentioned, spirit is manifest in the individual through passions; this is to say, strong convictions and beliefs. These passions spur men to act, creating conflict and events that create history, for the winners of these conflicts will enforce their beliefs on the losers. For commentator Réal Fillion, this phenomena can be described as follows:
Human beings tend to get "carried away" in the things that they do when they are accompanied by strong beliefs and commitments. Of course, human beings also cannot do without these strong beliefs and commitments, for they are what human beings are animated by, making of them the particular engaged human beings that they are. [...] In fact, this insistence on the passionate nature of human beings [...] explains the prevalence of conflict within history" (Fillion, 92).
Fillion is correct in his assumptions that conflict occurs through over-zealous passions, yet his rhetoric is to focused on individuals. Though this may be true in Hegel's philosophy that change is begot by individuals, it is not true in reality. Instead, in our contemporary society change is produced by nation-states. Therefore, change in history is performed by over-zealous states, not individuals, as a state's actions are by no means the product of one individual. Conflict is not between two individuals, but two states; this is to say that change in the international realm of politics is administered through war. Wars are the "events" that occur in history and push it towards its endpoint.
With the mechanics of history and how it occurs explained, we can consider what course history is taking, and then begin to answer the first question raised in response to Hegel; that is, is this course of history in fact "progress?" The first task is to consider what political form Hegel perceived history to be moving towards; at the end of history, Hegel believed all of the world's states would be liberal democracies (Fukuyama, xii). In the present day, certainly liberal democracy is the most common type of state, and a historiographical analysis will show that the number of liberal democracies throughout history has been steadily increasing, only ever lowering with the rise of fascism. It is also worth noting that when Francis Fukuyama employed such an analysis, he observed that the number of liberal democracies had more than doubled in a fifteen year period between 1975-1990 (Fukuyama, 50). It is therefore quite clear that if there has been any movement in history thus far, it has been the the spread of liberal democracy. Yet the question remains, is this progress?
There are two reasons why the growth of liberal democracies are progress. The first is that our society construes it to be the most just and ideal form of of government. Francis Fukuyama writes:
What is emerging victorious, in other words, is not so much liberal practice, a the liberal idea. That is to say, for a very large part of the world, there is now no ideology with pretensions to universality that is in a position to challenge liberal democracy, and no universal principle of legitimacy other than the sovereignty of the people (Fukuyama, 45).
He goes on to comment that "even non-democrats will have to speak the language of democracy in order to justify their deviation from the single universal standard" (Fukuyama, 45). Fukuyama is correct in his notion that this universal consensus legitimizes liberal democracy. Even democracies opponents have recognized this legitimacy and must find a way to reconcile their other-politik1within an international realm of liberal democracy.Therefore, it is progress for the majority believe it to be progress, and an improvement upon the world. And as in democracy, it is the majority's vote that succeeds and the minority has to find a way to accommodate itself.
The second reason is attributed to the "democratic peace thesis," which is the notion that liberal democracies to not go to war with each other. This the spread of democracy ideal so we can reach world peace (this would, in essence, be "the end of history"). It is first important to evaluate the legitimacy of the democratic peace theory. It is no coincidence that only rarely do liberal democracies go to war; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett posited that "democracies do not fight each other because norms of compromise and cooperation [which are embedded in liberal thought] prevent their conflicts of interest from escalating into violent clashes" (Maoz, 624). This is statement is true; the co-operative nature of liberalism deters them from waging war with one another.
Where Maoz and Russett are incorrect, however, is in their assumptions that "a clash between democratic and non-democratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather than the former" and "when a democratic state confronts a non-democratic one, it may be forced to adapt to the norms of international conduct of the latter lest it be exploited or eliminated by the non-democratic state" (Maoz, 625). Both of these statements are incorrect, as is evident with the ongoing conflict between the United States and Iraq, a war initiated by the former, is dominated by actions of the former, and most would agree is being played on the terms of the former. These conflicts are the product of "over-passionate" states aforementioned. These states are so strong in their convictions of liberal-democracy being the legitimate ideology, and other ideologies stripping their citizens of these liberal rights, they engage in conflict to enforce this ideology on the other as a means to legitimize and improve them.
It has been demonstrated up to this point that ,yes, there is such thing as "progress" in history; it is the spread of liberal-democracy across the world. It thus follows that liberal intervention in the middle east that we have witnessed so far will continue and result in liberal-democracy overcoming Islamic fundamentalism just as it did communism and fascism before it. To this extent, Hegel was correct in his account of history. But what will occur afterwards? With liberal-democracies in the Middle East, will we have reached the "end of history?" As Nietzsche will show us, when it comes to this, Hegel was incorrect.
In Twilight of The Idols, Nietzsche speaks of "a 'return to nature,' although it is actually not a going back but a coming up — up into high, free, even fearful nature and naturalness" (Nietzsche, 1033). What is meant by this passage is the age-old maxim that "history repeats itself." Nietzsche is stating that eventually, the ancient political ideologies to which we have progressed beyond will return. Remembering that a key argument for Fukuyama's defence of the end of history was that liberal-democracy had annihilated fascism, it is noted that with the current economic recession, there has been a significant increase in the number of votes for extreme-right candidates in several European countries. Though no candidate has gained enough votes to win a seat in any government, this phenomena shows that history does repeat itself, and the terrors that liberal-democracy has overcome can very easily return.
Therefore, to return to the questions posed in the introduction regarding Hegel's thesis, he was correct in assuming there was progress in history. There has been a general consensus in the world that liberal-democracy is the ideology that ideal and inherently just. This sense of legitimacy has created passions within individuals regarding liberal-democracy, and this creates over-passionate states who make it their task to spread the ideology throughout the world. These passions are part of a larger grand design in which the collective world spirit is pushing to reach a point where it has satisfied its goal for universal freedom —which can only be satisfied through international liberal-democracy — and there will be an end to conflict; all will be peaceful. This has been the goal of all events regarding liberal-democracies and is the goal of the current conflict in the middle east. However, as we have seen through Nietzsche's theory on history's eternal reoccurance and the reemergence of fascism. Therefore, when it comes to "the end of history," we have no reached it yet — nor will we ever. A new threat to democracy will emerge as soon as the last one is conquered, making the "end of history" an unattainable state.
Bibliography
Fillion, Réal. Multicultural Dynamics and The Ends of History: Exploring Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. 2008.
Fukuyama, Francis. The End Of History and The Last Man. New York: The Free Press. 1992.
Hegel, G.W.F. "The Philosophy of History." Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. 2002.
Maoz, Zeez and Bruce Russett. "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986." The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3. JSTOR. Web. 18 March, 2011.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Twilight of The Idols." Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. 2002.
1By "other-politik" I mean any form of state-craft that is not liberal democracy.