For Fandom Use Only (FFUO)

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Company Man

(AAR/IP) Laramie Season 1

Company Man

February 9th, 1960

Draft After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Handling Instructions

The title of this document is Company Man (Laramie Season 1).

The information gathered in this AAR/IP is classified as For Fandom Use Only (FFUO) and should be handled as sensitive information not to be disclosed. This document should be safeguarded, handled, transmitted, and stored in accordance with appropriate security directives. Reproduction of this document, in whole or in part, without prior approval from the issuing agency is prohibited.

At a minimum, the attached materials will be disseminated only on a need-to-know basis and when unattended, will be stored in a manner offering sufficient protection against theft, compromise, inadvertent access, and unauthorized disclosure.

Points of Contact:

Exercise Director:

John Champion
Executive Producer
Hollywood, California (or someplace a bit closer to Heaven, one hopes)

Exercise Evaluator:

Fortitudine
The Little Grey Bungalow
East Armpit, Illinois (it's not the end of the world, but you can see it from here).

Exercise Reviewer:

Gail G
Beta Extraordinaire
Detroit, Michigan (or pretty close to it).

CONTENTS

Administrative Handling Instructions p1

Contents p3

Executive Summary p5

Section 1: Exercise Overview p6

Exercise Details p6

Exercise Planning Team Leadership p6

Participating Organizations p7

Section 2: Exercise Design Summary p9

Exercise Purpose and Design p9

Capabilities and Activities Identified for Demonstration p9

Scenario Summary p9

Section 3: Analysis of Capabilites p11

Investigation and Law Enforcement p11

Critical Infrastructure Protection p13

On-site Incident Management p15

Section 4: Conclusion p18

Appendix A: Improvement Plan (to be issued when we get around to it, but who can improve on Slim and Jess?)

Appendix B: Lessons Learned (omitted-let's not go there)

Appendix C: Participant Feedback Summary (omitted because the number of responses would probably crash our email accounts)

Appendix D: Exercise Events Summary Table (omitted-go watch it on YouTube, for heavens' sake)

Appendix E: Performance Ratings (omitted but hell, we liked it)

Appendix F: Acronyms p19

Executive Summary

The Laramie Season 1 Exercise "Company Man" was developed to test the Sherman Ranch's On-site Incident Management, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and Investigation and Law Enforcement capabilities. The exercise planning team was composed of numerous and diverse individuals, all of whom are retired or gone their reward, including John Champion, Dan Ullman, Cyril Mockridge, Ray Rennahan, Martin Obzina, Richard G. Wray, Ray de Vally, Stanley Wilson, George Bisk, and John C. Grubb. The planning team discussed various possible scenarios (none of which bore much resemblance to life as actually lived on a ranch in Wyoming Territory in 1870 but why quibble?). Based on the planning team's deliberations, the following objectives were developed for "Company Man":

Objective 1: Showcase the Sherman Ranch personnel's ridin', shootin', and horsethief-catchin' skills while operating in an austere and high-risk environment

Objective 2: Demonstrate the Sherman Ranch personnel's ability to recover corporate property and resolve local customer service issues with minimal oversight from higher authority

Objective 3: Give the audience a rattling good time for forty-nine minutes and seven seconds

The purpose of this report is to analyze exercise results, identify strengths to be maintained and built upon, identify potential areas for further improvement, and support development of corrective actions.

Major Strengths

The major strengths identified during this exercise are as follows:

1). The episode demonstrates that Sherman Ranch personnel are capable of recouping stolen property within an acceptable time-frame and with limited external assistance

2). The episode contains one MMM (Major Melt Moment)

3). The episode teaches the important lesson that if you're a dirty double-crossing horse-thief you do not want to turn your back on Jess Harper. Particularly if he's holding a six-gun that he's liable to bend over your head. Twice. (Note: for final copy, replace with "demonstrates the effective employment of superior force-on-force assets.").

Primary Areas for Improvement

Throughout the exercise, several opportunities for improvement in the Sherman Ranch's ability to respond to the incident were identified. The primary areas for improvement, including recommendations, are as follows:

1). Insufficient perimeter security for the corrals

2). Complete absence of motion sensors, sirens, trip-wires, German Shepherds, or other EHDWE (early horse-thief detection and warning equipment)

3). Deliberate and unnecessary exposure of personnel (including ranch leadership) to hostile fire

4). Failure to observe proper weapons handling and mutual support procedures

The exercise is considered overall to be successful, as all stolen property was recovered, only one scheduled stage run was affected, and a single friendly casualty incurred (and that no loss, bad cess to him). Future exercises for the Sherman Ranch should focus on a faster response, increased infrastructure security, and on local pre-positioning of sufficient critical equine resupply to ensure the relay station is not left completely without mobility resources just prior to stage arrival.

Future exercises should also restrict external augmentation to previously-vetted personnel that, unlike Mr. Slade, do not exhibit behavior indicative of substance abuse and possess the necessary people skills to participate in operations of this type without alienating other team members, given the fact that they are all armed and can reasonably be assumed dangerous to a greater or lesser degree.

It is recommended that the Sherman Ranch and Relay Station management team use these exercises to outline the policies and procedures necessary to develop and refine their EOP (Emergency Operations Plan) and SOP (Standard Operational Procedures). Despite some minor setbacks and the issues already acknowledged, ranch personnel should agree that the exercise was beneficial and that additional training opportunities would be helpful in establishing and maintaining an enhanced readiness posture.

Exercise Reviewer's note: Maintenance of sufficient equine resources calls up issues of budget management as there is a tight correlation between numbers of equine units and feed requirements, particularly in a time of drought (you can't have a herd of useless cayuses eatin' their fool heads off an' not workin' just 'cause some company bean counter wants t'dot all the i's…

Exercise Evaluator's note: You need to stop spending so much time around Mr. Harper, as it is clear that his effect on neither your attitude nor your grammar can be considered salutary.

Exercise Reviewer's note: The determination of what faster response time consists of should rest upon objective evaluation of operational need versus physical possibility (if you wanna tell Jess Harper t'draw faster, I refuse t'be in the same room...hell, I refuse t'be in the same state).

Exercise Evaluator's note: Grammar again. I can see I'll have to do some editing before we release our report in final form. Kindly remember that this is a document for the record.

Exercise Reviewer's note: Efforts by out of state company management to include miscreant nephews, favorite sons and other forms of "remittance men" in future exercises are to be discouraged strongly. Also, the expectation that ranch personnel are going to agree that this was beneficial, or that a repetition would be helpful appear somewhat optimistic, and some consideration might be given to increased financial remuneration (as nobody's gettin' paid enough to put up with this er, stuff).

Exercise Evaluator's note: Nonsense. We're from the government and we're here to help.

Exercise Reviewer's note: While members of the relay station team are highly intelligent and literate, and one was a brevet lieutenant in the US Army, it is unclear what, if any experience either has had in drafting SOP's and EOP's. It is suggested that experienced administrative staff be assigned to assist (me, me, pick me!)

Exercise Evaluator's note: I agree with your assessment of "highly intelligent and literate" to describe the staff member who has occasionally been spotted actually reading a book – but I'm sure you're not referring to the one who appears to have what, three month's formal education? And while he may have started out in life fairly bright, repeated blunt force cranial trauma is bound to have had some effect. Still, your suggestion has merit. Do you think they have room for both of us?

Section 1: Exercise Overview

Exercise Name

Company Man

Type of Exercise

Full-scale exercise

Exercise Start Date

February 9th, 1960

Exercise End Date

February 9th, 1960

Duration

49 minutes, 7 seconds

Location/Jurisdiction

Sherman Ranch and Relay Station, Albany County, Wyoming Territory

Sponsor

NBC/Revue Studios

Program

Laramie (Season 1)

Mission

Protect, Respond and Recovery

Capabilities

Investigation and Law Enforcement

Critical Infrastructure Protection

Onsite Incident Management

Scenario Type

Asset Recovery with Active Shooter Component

Exercise Planning Team

The previously cited John Champion, Dan Ullman, Cyril Mockridge, Ray Rennahan, Martin Obzina, Richard G. Wray, Ray de Vally, Stanley Wilson, George Bisk, and John C. Grubb.

Participating Organizations

The Sherman Ranch and Relay Station

The Great Overland Mail Company

The Leach Gang (OPFOR)

Number of Participants

Players – Slim Sherman, Jess Harper, Andy Sherman, (NFI NMI) Jones, Jack Slade, Samuel Clemens, Mrs. Clark, Caroline Clark, Mose Shell

Victim Role Players – 8 horse-thieves, more or less, plus Jack Slade

Evaluators - 1

Reviewers – 1

Section 2: Exercise Design Summary

Exercise Purpose and Design

This exercise was conducted to test the Sherman Ranch and Relay Station's protection, response, and recovery capabilities during an asset recovery drill with active shooter component.

Exercise Objectives, Capabilities, and Activities

Capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items that were derived from the Target Capabilities List (TCL). The capabilities listed below form the foundation for the organization of all objectives and observations in this exercise. Additionally, each capability is linked to several corresponding activities and tasks to provide additional detail.

Based upon the identified exercise objectives below, the exercise planning team decided to demonstrate the following capabilities during this exercise:

Objective 1: Demonstrate the Sherman Ranch personnel's ridin', shootin', and horse thief-catchin' skills while operating in an austere and high-risk environment

Target Capability - Investigation and Law Enforcement

Objective 2: Demonstrate the Sherman Ranch personnel's ability recover corporate property and resolve local customer service issues with minimal oversight from higher authority

Target Capability - Critical Infrastructure Protection

Target Capability - Onsite Incident Management

Objective 3: Give the audience a rattling good time for forty-nine minutes and seven seconds

Target Capability - Onsite Incident Management

Scenario Summary

During the period specified, designated personnel from the Sherman Ranch and Relay Station (augmented by one staff member from headquarters) responded to a scenario involving the theft and subsequent recouping of valuable mobility assets for the Great Overland Mail Line. Other exercise players involved in the scenario were one driver/operator and three passengers from the line. OPFOR consisted of members of the Leach Gang; at least until they were wiped out almost to the last man. Exercise play included the above-mentioned misappropriation of assets, one attempted ambush, a sneak attack upon and subsequent wounding/death of several gang members, recovery of the assets already described, a frontal assault on the Sherman Ranch and Relay Station facility, one swell buddy moment (see note), and a great deal of angst and interpersonal conflict. Not to mention a dandy pistol-whipping. Occurrences incidental to the scenario with lesser and/or tangential impact were a lynching, an engagement, and excessive alcohol consumption.

(note: Mr. Sherman's confirmation of the important role played by Mr. Harper during ranch operations and his reassurance to this participant that things just wouldn't be the same without him and his troubles, is considered to be a key incident and fulfills the minimum episode requirement for an MMM. However, at this juncture an entirely amicable difference of opinion arose between the Exercise Evaluator and the Exercise Reviewer. The Exercise Reviewer, while wishing to credit the exercise planners for the MMM, considers the rest of the exercise to have been singularly lacking therein. A consistent pattern of MMM shortfalls might potentially have a negative effect on the morale of FDMs (Fandom Members) which could result in future funding issues. The Exercise Reviewer feels that one MMM per episode is insufficient and recommends a study group be recruited to determine the optimum number. Detailed evaluation of relevant data, i.e. episodes would be required. The Exercise Evaluator would like to point out that the Exercise Reviewer will undoubtedly volunteer to spearhead this initiative should her recommendation be adopted.)

Exercise Reviewer's note: Yer darn tootin' I do!

Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities

This section of the report reviews the performance of the exercised capabilities, activities, and tasks. In this section, observations are organized by capability and associated activities. The capabilities linked to the exercise objectives of "Company Man" are listed below, followed by corresponding activities. Each activity is followed by related observations, which include categorization of the observation as a Strength or an Area For Improvement, supporting references, analysis, and recommendations.

Capability 1: Investigation and Law enforcement

Capability Summary: Investigation and Law Enforcement is the capability that includes the broad range of activities undertaken by law enforcement and associated entities to detect, examine, probe, investigate, and conduct operations related to potential criminal activities. Current and emerging investigative techniques are used with an emphasis on training, legal frameworks, recognition of indications and warnings, source development, interdiction and specific related issues.

Activity 1.1: Deploy specially trained personnel duly authorized and trained in search, seizure, and/or intervention/interdiction operations. Execute tactical procedures to disarm, detain, or otherwise render harmless the suspects in accordance with the use of force policy/ROE (rules of engagement).

Observation 1.1: Area For Improvement. Initial pursuit of OPFOR following the discovery of the perimeter breach and subsequent asset loss resulted in the deliberate and unwarranted exposure of a key ranch leadership figure to hostile fire.

References:

1). The Office for Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security: Prevention and Deterrence, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, June 2003.

2). Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1999.

Analysis: In light of the considerable amount of responsibility resting on Mr. Sherman's shoulders and the disruption to the ranch command structure that would result should his billet be vacated, the decision to advance on a suspected OPFOR outpost was unwise. Mr. Sherman is, from a COOP (Continuity of Operations) standpoint, irreplaceable.

Recommendations: Deployment of lower-ranking personnel would have been equally effective and more strategically sound.

Exercise Reviewer's note: Developing a decision tree for these incidents is recommended, which might include rubrics such as who went last time, who has a current romantic interest, where Andy is at the moment, whether anyone has already suffered damage and/or is ill, and who is considered the best shot under those circumstances. Further required data might be, who knows the country/and or fugitive or fugitive type best. This assumes a decision mutually agreed upon among Sherman Ranch and Relay Station personnel; when the choice lies between ranch personnel and adjuncts, the adjunct should always go. It is recommended that a strict protocol for managing the impulse of either Mr. Harper or Mr. Sherman to throw themselves into harm's way be established (good luck with that one, btw).

Exercise Evaluator's note: It is simply unfathomable that Mr. Sherman should be allowed to risk his neck (not to mention those shoulders) in such fashion. The thought is devastating. Not merely from a COOP standpoint but in every way, the man is utterly priceless. He could have sent that other fella.

Observation 1.2: Strength. The follow-on response conducted by ranch personnel, augmented by Mr. Slade, was sudden, decisive, and concluded with no friendly casualties and a complete recovery of the stolen assets. Area for Improvement. Mr. Slade's disregard for the local use of force policies/ROE while in some respects an admirably aggressive protocol, sets a bad precedent for future operations.

References:

1). The Office for Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security: Prevention and Deterrence, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, June 2003, op. cit.

2). Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1999, op. cit.

3). Crisis Counseling and Assistance Training Program Guidance, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, National Mental Health Information Center, 2004.

Analysis: Mr. Slade's questionable mental stability and pattern of alcohol dependence rendered him singularly ill-equipped to function within a fast-moving, high-stress environment. It does not appear that substance abuse treatment, as mandated by state and Federal standards under ADA (the Americans With Disabilities Act), was ever offered to him. Furthermore, no documentation exists that an assessment of Mr. Slade's mental status was completed prior to his purchase of firearms. It cannot be emphasized enough that his deployment on this exercise is considered to have been highly detrimental to inter-agency cooperation.

Recommendations: Augmentation personnel must be subject to sufficient screening and credentialing to ensure the presence in the AOA (Area of Operations) only of those individuals who are psychologically as well as tactically prepared.

Exercise Reviewer's note: Use of the Millon Personality inventory, or the MMPI or the Addiction Severity Index is recommended; the Rorschach is contraindicated with alcoholics, who are already seeing bats, snakes and spiders.

Exercise Evaluator's note: Perhaps we're being unfair. Could Mr. Slade have merely been suffering from depressed serotonin levels?

Observation 1.3: Strength. Although outnumbered and hampered by the presence in the AOA of an unarmed and under-aged civilian, ranch personnel augmented by Mr. Slade were able to effect a complete neutralization of the threat posed by OPFOR's final assault. Area for Improvement. Given that the Sherman Ranch and Relay Station is a long-established facility operating in a high-risk environment, the Exercise Evaluator finds it puzzling that prior defensive preparation of the avenues of approach, to include the establishment of mutually supporting interlocking fields of fire, was not conducted well in advance of the exercise. Additionally, numerous safety violations and instances of improper weapons-handling were observed, and were plausible contributing factors to the demise of Mr. Slade.

References:

1). National Incident Management System, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, March 2004.

2). National Response Plan. Worker Safety and Health Support Annex, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, December 2004.

3). MCWP 3-1, Ground Combat Operations, U.S. Marine Corps, November 2002.

Analysis: Comments withheld pending completion of the on-going investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Mr. Slade. However, ranch personnel's failure to follow standard close combat procedures is identified as a critical shortcoming and will need to be addressed in a timely and effective manner.

Recommendations: It is not improbable that, again pending completion of the investigation into Mr. Slade's death, disciplinary action up to and including legal proceedings may be forthcoming. At a minimum, mandatory refresher training in a number of areas to include fire discipline, rapid reloading and noncombatant safety should be immediately implemented.

Exercise Reviewer's note: It is suggested that be left to local LEO's (Law Enforcement Officers), who are well acquainted with the personalities; it is not within the company's purview (don't go there...seriously, don't go there). Mr. Slade's um, quick trigger finger and sociopathic tendencies have resulted in some highly questionable scenarios. The company does not need to appear to be defending, or mourning him (the guy was a psychopathic drunk with a death wish. We're lucky it ended as well as it did). Re mandatory retraining, I'm assuming you want to show up and shoot target practice with the boys? Tut-tut...not sure that's an appropriate use of company training funds (can I come too? please?)

Exercise Evaluator's note: I just had a vision of me attempting to teach Mr. Harper safe weapons-handling procedures and it wasn't pretty. I'll pass this one along to a contractor; I'd like to live long enough to draw my pension.

Capability 2: Critical Infrastructure Protection

Capability Summary: The Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) capability enables public and private entities to identify, assess, prioritize, and protect critical infrastructure and key resources so they can detect, prevent, deter, devalue, and mitigate deliberate efforts for their removal, destruction, nullification or exploitation.

Activity 2.1: Develop and maintain plans, procedures, programs and systems to ensure the physical security of critical assets and key resources. Implement plans, procedures, programs and systems in response to specific and local threats. Allocate resources to address targeted priorities and assess program effectiveness.

Observation 2.1: Area For Improvement. The protection afforded to critical equine mobility assets was sadly lacking.

References:

1). National Infrastructure Protection Plan, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, June 2006.

2). Risk Management: An Essential Guide to Protecting Critical Assets, National Infrastructure Protection Center, November 2002.

3). Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, December 2003.

Analysis: The central scenario incident, loss of high-consequence corporate assets, is considered to have been completely preventable. Findings included lack of corral perimeter security as well as any type of EHDWE.

Recommendations: A comprehensive HVA (Hazard Vulnerability Analysis) should be immediately conducted by an independent third party and recommendations adopted after evaluation for cost-effectiveness. This should be done with all due dispatch and before the arrival in the area of any new threat. Establishment of local pre-positioned back-up mobility assets for immediate resupply is also strongly encouraged.

Exercise Reviewer's note: Regarding corral perimeter security, given the primitive infrastructure, aside from stronger nails the options appear limited to the acquisition of a dog. Or maybe geese, which make excellent, er, guard dogs, and are less apt to be trampled by an arriving stage than those darn chickens.

Exercise Evaluator's note: Mr. Shell is darn lucky we weren't evaluating HIM.

Observation 2.2: Area for Improvement. Damage to assets by ranch personnel's disregard for basic precautionary measures is apparently so common as to be unremarkable.

References:

1). Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, December 2003, .

2). Etiquette in Society, In Business, In Politics, and At Home, Emily Post,1922.

Analysis: A participant was observed at one point during the exercise lying down on his bed with his spurs on. While it must be acknowledged that this is quite possibly a gender-related shortcoming, and the individual in question was suffering at the time from a considerable amount of personal stress, the holes in his bedding were probably substantial enough to render it unserviceable and require replacement. In these times of budgetary shortfalls such actions are fiscally irresponsible and cannot be encouraged.

Recommendations: Removal of spurs and other sharp objects prior to lounging, lying, sitting, leaning against or otherwise utilizing linens, blankets, interior walls, doors, woodwork, furniture and rugs is strongly recommended. Posting of signage warning of the consequences of such behavior would undoubtedly effect a reduction in similar incidents.

Exercise Reviewer's note: Since internal accessories are the property of SR inhabitants, it is recommended that the signage be phrased very tactfully (these men are armed...and already pissed off) additionally, some means of recompense from the company for exercise- related damage (bullet holes) might be considered.

Exercise Evaluator's note: Oh, come on. Was the man born in a barn? It's simply good manners. And I see he's won you over to his way of thinking that higher headquarters is made of money. Economies of scale on the local level equate to lower operating costs all around, remember.

Capability 3: On-site Incident Management

Capability Summary: On-Site Incident Management is the capability to effectively direct and control incident activities, including the directing of large and complex events and to obtain, track and assign incident resources for multi-agency response operations. It should include processes for ensuring the safety, security, structural integrity and self-sufficiency of facilities, equipment and personnel.

Activity 3.1:Implement on-site incident management after initial assessment. Execute Incident Action Plan for assigned operations and deploy resources as necessary.

Observation 3.1: Strength. After breaking off contact with OPFOR, ranch personnel withdrew to the facility to begin assessment and damage control, to include customer service efforts.

Reference:The National Incident Management System, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, March 2004, op. cit.

Analysis: The immediate response once ranch personnel returned to assume on-site management duties was to assess resource availability and implement a backup plan. Lacking the necessary mobility assets to keep the scheduled stage run on time, the alternate course of action directed by Mr. Slade was to allow rest these assets and continue the run later the same day. To compensate them for the inconvenience, a complimentary meal was offered to the affected passengers. Slade is to be commended (or would be if he were still alive) for doing much to placate one particularly high maintenance passenger, a Mrs. Clark. A subsequent misunderstanding between Mr. Slade and another passenger, a Mr. Clemens, was defused by the quick actions of ranch personnel. The stage line was able to resume operations after a minimal period of inactivity and there have been no reports of any formal complaint filed by Mrs. Clark (despite the fact that she managed to lose her daughter who left the stagecoach and is evidently still floating around the AOA somewhere).

Recommendations: Although the late Mr. Slade was within his scope as manager to offer some form of compensation, a pre-determined list of such services should be drawn up with commensurate levels of authority outlined along with an associated monetary amount. This will mitigate any overly-generous impulses on the part of front-line staff.

Observation 3.2: Strength. Analysis/recommendations in re: the actions of ranch personnel during the final OPFOR assault have been outlined in the remarks under Activity 1.1. One further incident of particular note was the somewhat tardy but highly effective use of superior force-on-force assets by ranch personnel immediately following the fatal shooting of Mr. Slade, resulting in the final and complete destruction of OPFOR personnel's ability and will to fight.

References:

1). MCWP 3-1, Ground Combat Operations, U.S. Marine Corps, November 2002, .

3) Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Pocket Guide, U.S. Department of Defense, June 2011.

Analysis: Deployment of weapons and forces in a tactical situation is a decision that is best left to on-scene personnel, with considerable discretion as to the best use of the means at their disposal. With Mr. Sherman in a position that no longer permitted mutual fire support (an unfortunate disruption in asset concentration but mandated by the presence already noted of the unarmed and under-age civilian), Mr. Harper's decisive if unorthodox use of his sidearm in alternate offensive mode against the last remaining OPFOR member was successful in neutralizing what was left of the threat.

Recommendations: None. Mr. Harper's mastery of the combat principles of maneuver, initiative and surprise is to be commended.

Exercise Reviewer: Ya think?

Exercise Evaluator's note: Don't act so surprised; I am quite capable of giving credit where credit is due. Let the record show that these laudable qualities do not entirely make up for his tendency to go charging into things like a short, angry bull.

Section 4: Conclusion

The Exercise Evaluator is loath to mention it, but Mr. Harper's prior criminal record, while not generally considered a desirable employee attribute, was no doubt instrumental in effecting the drill's positive outcome. However; any retention decisions, as well as future operational utilization of his unique skill set, should take Mr. Harper's disregard for standard safety procedures under advisement, offset though it may be by his demonstrated ability to rapidly respond to a dynamic tactical situation. This participant would do well to cultivate a reasonable degree of personal prudence; anger management training is also strongly recommended.

In Mr. Harper's case, Mr. Sherman's failure to conduct the required pre-employment background check and refusal to recognize Mr. Slade's authority to terminate might, under the circumstances, be tolerated. That being said, these decisions did call his judgment into question and he should be cautioned that corporate perceptions of his managerial acumen and his facility's potential for further service can potentially be jeopardized.

As infrastructure protection has been determined to be a critical vulnerability at the Sherman Ranch and Relay Station, an improvement program should be immediately adopted and thoroughly implemented. The Exercise Evaluator feels very strongly that external oversight is necessary to ensure compliance and is willing to arrange her schedule to assist Mr. Sherman in facilitating this. She would prefer, however, that he coordinate the disarming of ranch personnel prior to her return.

Exercise Reviewer's comment: I've been trained in pat-down, clothed body search techniques. If Mr. Harper scares you that much I'd be happy to do a weapons check on him.

Exercise Evaluator's comment: I'll just bet you would.

Exercise Reviewer's comment: In conclusion, a mild disagreement here in that retention decisions should be left to the owner of the station, as should any remediation of either Mr. Harper's impulsivity or significant emotional reactivity. Mr. Sherman has already demonstrated a unique capability in the latter, and it would serve the secondary purpose of increasing MMM's. Should experienced therapeutic assistance be required, I'd be willing to consult. Really, I would. Truly. Any time. Regarding Mr. Sherman's employment practices, I have long held that the prescreening form should include a section for "gut instinct". Mr. Sherman's exercise of that instinct has secured the services of a talented security unit for the relay station in Mr. Harper. And while on the topic, I still think gut instinct should be one of the categories assessed under Capability 1. There's a lot to be said for, 'if you don't like him, bend your gun over his head until you can check his bona fides...'

Exercise Evaluator's note: Although there is a certain visceral satisfaction associated with that course of action, I'm not going to include it as a recommendation. I think we're already in enough trouble.

Well, let's run this one up the flagpole and see if anybody salutes.

Table F.1: Acronyms

Acronym/Meaning

ADA - Americans With Disabilities Act

AOA - Area of Operations

CIP - Critical Infrastructure Protection

COOP -Continuity of Operations

EHDWE - Early Horse-thief Detection and Warning Equipment

EOP - Emergency Operating Procedures

FDM - Fandom Members

HVA - Hazard Vulnerability Analysis

LEO - Law Enforcement Officer

MMM - Major Melt Moment

NFI - No First Name

NMI - No Middle Name

OPFOR - Opposition Forces

ROE - Rules of Engagement

SOP - Standard Operating Procedures

TCL - Target Capabilities List

Jurisdiction: The Sherman Ranch

FFUO