Annex papers submitted by M. Webb following Central Intelligence Agency recommendations and intelligence on Soviet-aligned diplomatic and military activity in the Asian theatre.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 194 OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR RECEIPT OF BY AND UNAUTHORSED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

11 November 1949 - China/USSR/Korea - Unification of Chinese and Soviet Forces and Plans for War in Northeast Asia

The chairman of the Chinese Communist-North Korean-Soviet Joint Staff Departmental Pyongyang is Soviet Lieutenant General Ku-pa-no-fu (0657/1572/6179/1133). Hsien-ch'u (7281/0341/2806), commander of the Chinese Communist 40 Army, and HONG Tal-sin (3163/6671/5256), a Korean, are vice chairmen. All Chinese Communist and Soviet advisers to the North Korean Army are attached to this Department, which is in charge of the reorganization and re-equipping of North Korean troops.

In October 1949 a Sino-Soviet Joint Staff Headquarters was established in Mukden. Soviet Lieutenant General Ku-pa-no-fu is chairman, He attended a conference in 1949 at which the Far Eastern Military Alliance was ratified and is head of the Sino-Soviet-Korean Military Build-up Committee, with headquarters at Antung established in 1949, HO Chin-nien, deputy commander of the Northeast Military Area, is deputy chairman. This headquarters will direct all Chinese and Soviet forces in all military operations in Manchuria and Korea. It is unclear to what extent naval and air commanders are integrated into this structure.

The unification of Chinese and Soviet Far East forces will be decided by the end of June, LIU Shao-ch'i, CHU Te, and LIN Piac will be members of a Sino-Soviet Joint Command Headquarters, and NIBH Jung-chen, HSU Chiang-ch'ien, and HO Lung will be chief's of staff, According to a joint Sino-Soviet. statement, a front line from Korea to Indochina including the southeast Chine coast will be under the command of P'ENG Te-huai, CH'EN Li, and LIV Po-ch'eng with CH'EN Keng, SU Yu, and TENG Hua as deputies.

In the initial period of the war according to the Sino-Soviet interim alliance agreement concluded in September 1948 the Maritime Military District committed six divisions, East Siberia committed eight divisions, and West Siberia will commit eight divisions, five of the eight of the West Siberian divisions will help the Chinese strengthen the defences of Dairen, Port Arthur and the Pohai Gulf, in order to create a situation for an active offensive and to take Japan, Soviet Marshal Malinoveki will be supreme commander of Far East Army, Navy, and Air Forces, and CHU Te and LIU Shao'chi will be his deputies. The Chinese will assume responsibility to supply replacements and food in accordance with the views of the Far East Headquarters. The strength of the front line will be 2,00,000 to 3,500,000 men.

It is unclear what position senior Soviet officers such as ZHUKOV Georgy and SMONIAK Nikolai remain in military and strategic command of all Korean-Chinese-Soviet forces in Asia. It is highly likely ZHUKOV represents a 'military ambassador' of sorts, rather than directing military forces in Asia directly. Nevertheless, the influence of these officers should not be ignored on the general character of Sino-Soviet-Korean planning, organisation and operations.

The main strength of the Soviet forces which were stationed north of Sunchiat'al (121-56, 39-57) have been ordered to move south along a line from Chinchou (121-07, 41-07) to Tahushan (122-07, 41-38), Also branches of ten military and political training schools and three airborne training school from Tsitsihar, Changchun, and Kirin moved to the Chinchou-Tahushan area, a branch of the Sunghwachiang Naval Academy was recently established at Hulutao (121-01, 40-44). In mid-April, except for a division of KAO Sang's forces at T'aenan (122-47,45-2.) and Angangeh'i. (12348, 47-09).

2 June 1949 - China/USSR/Korea Soviet Control of Air Forces, Antung, Soviet Air Reserve Force, Dairen-Port Arthur

Comment: This information was received during the period 15 April-1 June 1949

The Sino-Soviet-Korean Air Forces Combined Command Headquarters at Antung is under the direct command of the Soviet Far East Headquarters. Soviet Air Force General Nomansk is senior adviser to the Antung headquarters. Soviet Air Force Colonel Zatsarev is chief adviser to the Chinese Communist and North Korean Joint Operations Section, Air Headquarters, Antung.

All MIG sorties over North Korea are directed by a Soviet air commander. Soviet pilots often lead attacks against UASF fighters; other times they act as spotters, directing from higher altitudes the attacking Chinese Communist and North Korean pilots.

The four airfields known as the Antung Complex have a minimum of 500 jet fighters attached at any given time. Under command of 300 Soviet Air Force officers, 800 North Korean Air Force personnel and 3,000 Chinese Communist Air Force personnel are available for duty on a 24 hour basis.

The Soviet Air Advisory Commission, under General Nomansk, is responsible to the Soviet air commander of the Dairen-Port Arthur area. Round-the-clock flights from Dairen to the Antung Complex fields are piloted exclusively by Soviet airmen while Soviet air officers rotate to Dairen and Port Arthur for rest leave. Families of senior air officers are quartered in the Port Arthur area.

The Soviet Air Force has approximately 2000 aircraft in Port Arthur and Dairen. These planes are jets, conventional fighters, and light bombers of Soviet origin. These aircraft are exclusive of those planes assigned to the Chinese Communist Air Force.

These Soviet reserve force planes are committed to the 'air exclusion zone' announced as a reaction to USAF bombing of the Korean peninsula, while others based on the Peninsula operate against USAF air assets south of the Daegon area. Soviet Far East aircraft will carry a variety of markings and it is confirmed that different nationalities will fly in different planes to create confusion among USAF forces. Soviet air tactics and training is present in all Sino-Korean forces. Occasionally experienced Soviet formations will fly intentionally decrease performance to lure USAF attacks. Any unidentified formation must be assumed to be of veteran capabilities, and it is suspected that experimental Soviet air assets have been deployed including during the EXPUNGED, 1950.

1 February 1950 - China/USSR/Korea - Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence - Subject: Soviet and 'International Volunteer'' Forces

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NFORMATION REPORT - TOP SECRET

Since the beginning of the Korean war, there has been an increasing number of reports of Soviet troops in Communist China, Manchuria, and Korea. The accumulated evidence available to CIA confirms the existence of Soviet line combat units in these areas: Liaoning and Jilin (Manchuria) as well as Kangwon, Kaesong and Chagang (Korea) with the regional headquarters in Pyongyang. GSE Furthermore, some organized Soviet anti-aircraft, artillery, signal, engineer, and coast artillery units are probably present although they may be attached to Chinese or North Korean forces in technical or training capacities further south. Some units which appear to be Soviet, may be in fact be Chinese with Soviet advisors. It is known that there are many Soviet military advisors in these areas. It is estimated that there are 30,000 Soviet advisors with the Chinese Communist military forces alone. No significant Soviet Army formations are present in the areas of Jeolla, Gyeongsang or Chungcheong but it is highly likely formations could be deployed swiftly to these locations.

Intelligence confirms both low level operational reports, as well as announcements by the governments of North Korea, China and the USSR of the formation of an International Volunteer Army. Due to Soviet disinformation tactics it is unclear whether this army is deployed in Korea independently of national armies and formations already there, or whether these formations are themselves within the overall structure of the IVA. Unconfirmed reports state that this force will be used in an invasion of Japan and/or Taiwan, however despite Soviet naval forces in both Port Arthur and the Sea of Japan any naval operation is unlikely. Reports allege variously that this army is composed of nationals from every European Satellite, ''Mongols,'' Japanese (as many as 300,000), Chinese, Indians, Malays, Indonesians, Burmese and Filipinos, as well as Soviets. The most conservative report indicates that the International Volunteer Force is merely another name for a Soviet-sponsored tactical advisory group whose 40,000 personnel will be distributed among the North Korean and Chinese Communist tactical units opposing the UN forces. The most extreme statement refers to 2,500,000 men. The figure most frequently mentioned is about 400,000 men with associated supporting units.

It has also been reported that an International Volunteer Air Force has been organized with headquarters at Mukden. The commander of this force reputedly is the deputy commander of the Soviet Far Eastern Air Forces. It has-been alleged that, under the agreement establishing this force, the USSR was to supply 4,500 aircraft and that most of the pilots were to be Soviet. It is confirmed that significant Soviet air assets are already based in the Korean peninsula as well as Manchuria. It is highly likely the current air exclusion zone established by Soviet-aligned forces north of the Daejeon area interdicting USAF operations in that area is directed from the Soviet headquarters in Pyongyang.

The principal confirmed fact that emerges from the welter of reports of an International Volunteer Force is that the Communist ground and air forces involved in the Korean conflict are already of an international character, and, insofar as the Chinese Communists are concerned, they are ''volunteers.'' Any foreign units that may now be committed are almost certainly incorporated within the existing Sino-Soviet-North Korean command framework. Hence, since this de facto Communist International Force already exists in the Far East, the Communists can label the entire force as 'International Volunteer Force' by fiat at any time. Therefore, from a political perspective is not considered significant that certain formations may be technically under specific national commands as the end result remains the same.

Although all the motives for the creation of a Communist International Volunteer Force'' may not be fully apparent at the present time, the USSR has one great advantage in having such a force active in the Far East: a Communist "International Volunteer Force'' has provided the USSR with both a medium and a pretext for expanded participation in the Korean war, while disguising the specific units involved, allowing the confirmed deployment of veteran Guards Armored units alongside recently formed Korean armoured units. This participation has been gradually increased to a point where a state of war between the US and the USSR would exist in fact: Through the device of the International Volunteer Force, however, the USSR might expect to deny the US a legitimate basis for a direct attack on the USSR, thus nullifying the most potent striking force of the US. Public statements from the governments of France and Britain confirm the reluctance of allied nations to participate in actions in the Asian theatre which could escalate this conflict outside said theatre.

WILLIAM L. LANGER

Assistant Director National Estimates

Michael they basically ignored these.

I brought up a few of your points from the initial report but I know that only a few of the others actually read any of the recommendations. No one trust you lot, not since the failures in anticipating the nuclear testing or the lack of naval build up, or all the rest of it. You know how much tension there is at the moment and while Kramer et al. are more receptive and actually talk to people we have to do everything through these back channels because the 'Shogun' won't hear it. There's a final meeting before you-know-what is properly decided, and maybe I'll be able to slip a few points into the meeting notes.

First meeting is Tuesday, but Thursday is more important. We'll talk Monday.

R. Armstrong

P.S. watch your back!