forgive the little squiggles, thatÕs because IÕm uploading from a mac. As soon as I ge to school (2 weeks) IÕll change Ôem. Also, erm, this is my work, asll written by me etc. Anyone who wants to nick it for a school essay, just ask me foirst ok? Tho IÕm sure you wouldnÕt want to ^_~
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Can GodÕs commands serve as the foundations for morality?
The argument is thus:
1 God says, ÒThou should not kill.Ó
C Therefore, you should not kill
The main problem with this argument is based on the Ô is/oughtÕ gap - that from a descriptive statement, you cannot logically get a prescriptive statement. From what God says, there is no logical jump to us actually having to do it. So, we add another premise:
1 God commands Òyou ought not kill.Ó
2 You ought to do what God says
C Therefore, you ought not kill
This premise allows ÔCÕ (a prescriptive statement) to be deduced from a descriptive statement and a prescriptive statement, which is logically possible.
Now we have another problem. Why ought we do what God says? Is what God says good, just because he says it is? Or is God telling us it is good, because it already is?
If it already good, and God is merely describing it, then God cannot be all-powerful, as the standard of goodness is independent of Him, He has no say over it. Is it independent? We can ask the question, Òwould you kill someone?Ó to a non-Christian, and they would (probably!) reply Òno.Ó If we ask them why, they would say something like. ÒI would feel guilty, I donÕt want to hurt anyone.Ó Most people define an act of ÔgoodnessÕ as something that harms the least number of people. They can define morality, without mentioning God at all, which shows that morality can stand on its own two feet, and is therefore independent of God. However, this is an unsatisfactory conclusion, as God is necessarily all-powerful.
If what God says is good, just because He says it, we encounter another problem. we can word it like this:
If Òwhat God commandsÓ = ÒGoodÓ, then ÒWe ought to do what God commands, because what God commands is GoodÒ turns into ÒWe ought to do what God commands, because what God commands is what God commands.Ó
This statement doesnÕt make sense, as it just repeats itself, and therefore is invalid.
Another argument arising from this is that if, one day, God decided to remove all the ÔnotsÕ from His commands, therefore turning it to ÒYou should killÓ then, because what God says is necessarily good because He says it, it is good to kill. However, this makes morality seem like an ÔaccidentÕ, that is only bad to kill because he happened to have put a ÔnotÕ in that day. and it also conflicts with something inside of ourselves, which suggests that morality really does have a foundation in something other than God.
An alternative is to say Òwe ought to do what God commands because God Himself is goodÓ, but that just leads to the conclusion that once again, God is subject to ÔgoodÕ, that He isnÕt all-powerful, and it also allows us to judge GodÕs actions.
In conclusion, I do not think that Gods commands can serve as the foundations for morality. The fact that if the command had been ÒYou should killÓ, it would still conflict with something inside us leads me to believe that there is something else as that foundation, and also, that you are able to say ÒI donÕt want to kill because I donÕt want to hurt anyoneÓ without mentioning God at all goes to prove that goodness is independent of God.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Can GodÕs commands serve as the foundations for morality?
The argument is thus:
1 God says, ÒThou should not kill.Ó
C Therefore, you should not kill
The main problem with this argument is based on the Ô is/oughtÕ gap - that from a descriptive statement, you cannot logically get a prescriptive statement. From what God says, there is no logical jump to us actually having to do it. So, we add another premise:
1 God commands Òyou ought not kill.Ó
2 You ought to do what God says
C Therefore, you ought not kill
This premise allows ÔCÕ (a prescriptive statement) to be deduced from a descriptive statement and a prescriptive statement, which is logically possible.
Now we have another problem. Why ought we do what God says? Is what God says good, just because he says it is? Or is God telling us it is good, because it already is?
If it already good, and God is merely describing it, then God cannot be all-powerful, as the standard of goodness is independent of Him, He has no say over it. Is it independent? We can ask the question, Òwould you kill someone?Ó to a non-Christian, and they would (probably!) reply Òno.Ó If we ask them why, they would say something like. ÒI would feel guilty, I donÕt want to hurt anyone.Ó Most people define an act of ÔgoodnessÕ as something that harms the least number of people. They can define morality, without mentioning God at all, which shows that morality can stand on its own two feet, and is therefore independent of God. However, this is an unsatisfactory conclusion, as God is necessarily all-powerful.
If what God says is good, just because He says it, we encounter another problem. we can word it like this:
If Òwhat God commandsÓ = ÒGoodÓ, then ÒWe ought to do what God commands, because what God commands is GoodÒ turns into ÒWe ought to do what God commands, because what God commands is what God commands.Ó
This statement doesnÕt make sense, as it just repeats itself, and therefore is invalid.
Another argument arising from this is that if, one day, God decided to remove all the ÔnotsÕ from His commands, therefore turning it to ÒYou should killÓ then, because what God says is necessarily good because He says it, it is good to kill. However, this makes morality seem like an ÔaccidentÕ, that is only bad to kill because he happened to have put a ÔnotÕ in that day. and it also conflicts with something inside of ourselves, which suggests that morality really does have a foundation in something other than God.
An alternative is to say Òwe ought to do what God commands because God Himself is goodÓ, but that just leads to the conclusion that once again, God is subject to ÔgoodÕ, that He isnÕt all-powerful, and it also allows us to judge GodÕs actions.
In conclusion, I do not think that Gods commands can serve as the foundations for morality. The fact that if the command had been ÒYou should killÓ, it would still conflict with something inside us leads me to believe that there is something else as that foundation, and also, that you are able to say ÒI donÕt want to kill because I donÕt want to hurt anyoneÓ without mentioning God at all goes to prove that goodness is independent of God.